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Clearing and Settlement -
Market Change and Public Interest
In summary, the clearing and settlement
sector has witnessed the following developments:
• The Giovannini Group meeting
under the auspices of the Commission, published its first and
second reports in 2001 and 2003 respectively, which identified
15 mainly national barriers and suggested practical steps to
address each of these
• In 2001, DG Competition performed a broad review of
the clearing and settlement sector. Subsequently, an infringement
decision was adopted against Clearstream in June 2004, but no
fines were imposed. Clearstream is currently appealing the decision.
In August 2004, DG Competition published for consultation an
overview report about the securities markets infrastructure
in the EU 25 countries.
• DG Markt has also published two Communications on this
topic (2002 and 2004).
• The European Parliament adopted a Resolution in January
2003 (ECON Report known as the Andria Report) which highlighted
the problems with clearing and settlement arrangements for cross-border
transactions;
• In 2003, the Group of Thirty (G-30) (an international
body of 30 individuals who collectively represent expertise
in global financial services regulation) issued recommendations
looking at the global issues related to clearing and settlement.
• In October 2004, the ESCB/CESR Working Group produced
standards for clearing and settlement systems in the EU which
are based on CPSS-IOSCO recommendations for securities settlement
systems and include additional requirements deemed necessary
for the European context;
A broad consensus exists among both
industry and regulators that the desired end state for the structure
of clearing and settlement systems in the EU must be less complex
if it is to become more efficient. This does not necessarily mean
a single central clearing or settlement system, like the DTCC
(Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation) model in the US,
but does imply harmonisation of market practices and legal and
fiscal frameworks and further rationalisation and consolidation
of providers. Critical factors to achieve this include: harmonised
connectivity of common system platforms; interoperability between
markets/systems through harmonised standards and common technical
protocols; free and open access to infrastructures; convergence
of rules and practices; transparent pricing; and appropriate governance
structures addressing user needs (i.e. improving services and
reducing costs), as well as systemic risk concerns.
There has already been some market-led
progress towards achieving some of these goals. There has been
considerable involvement by EU financial institutions, both individual
banks and service providers and by associations. This includes
work by ECSDA (the European Central Securities Depository Association)
and EACH (European Association of Clearing Counterparty Houses)
to move towards harmonised systems and processes and also work
led by the European Securities Forum and the European Banking
Federation. Examples of this work include the harmonisation of
opening days and opening hours of Central Securities Depositories
(CSDs) to be compatible with Target 2. In addition, there has
been some consolidation of institutions involved in the market,
for example the creation of Euroclear Group incorporating the
CSDs of France, Belgium, Netherlands, UK and Ireland, the creation
of LCH.Clearnet, and the consolidation across the Swedish, Finnish
and Baltic markets. These are important steps but there is still
a great deal more to be done, in terms of the delivery of common
technical settlement platforms and harmonisation of market practices
including in the field of taxation.
EU financial players, in particular
the securities and banking industry, are working closely with
regulators and the Commission to help shape a realistic and balanced
future vision for the clearing and settlement infrastructure in
Europe.
The Commission’s View
The Commission’s most recent Communication identifies the
following measures and policies as the key to the achievement
of its stated objective of “the creation of EU securities
clearing and settlement systems that are efficient and safe and
which ensure a level playing field among the different providers
of clearing and settlement services”:
(a) the liberalisation and integration
of existing securities clearing and settlement systems through
the introduction of comprehensive access rights at all levels
and the removal of existing barriers to cross-border clearing
and settlement;
(b) the continued application of competition policy to address
restrictive market practices and to monitor further industry
consolidation;
(c) the adoption of a common regulatory and supervisory framework
that ensures financial stability and investor protection, leading
to the mutual recognition of systems;
(d) the implementation of appropriate governance arrangements.
As specific follow-up to its Communication,
the Commission intends to conduct a regulatory impact analysis
(expected in the summer of 2005), before deciding whether to propose
a directive on clearing and settlement It sees the directive as
a complement to the market-led removal of the barriers identified
in the Giovannini Reports. Together these initiatives should provide
a secure legal framework with common requirements across the EU.
Such a framework would, the Commission believes, lift barriers
to cross-border business on the basis of mutual recognition of
the various national clearing and settlement systems (i.e. relying
on home country supervision).
The Commission states that if a Directive
is proposed, it will be a Lamfalussy-style initiative establishing
principles of:
• comprehensive rights of
access and choice;
• a common regulatory framework; and
• appropriate governance arrangements.
Industry’s View
The development of the clearing and settlement infrastructure
clearly requires a combination of regulatory initiatives and market
forces. There are differing views among market users and infrastructure
providers as to where and/or when additional legislation may be
required. In particular, the infrastructure providers believe
that the focus should be on removing the Giovannini barriers and
that, while a directive that focuses on consistent regulation
might be helpful, existing national and European competition law
already provides an adequate safeguard for the maintenance of
a fair and level playing field in Europe.
Some intermediaries believe that the functions executed by CSD’s
& CCP’s (central counter parties) should be acknowledged
as essential utilities for the industry. They have voiced concerns
that, in the longer term, the consolidation of the clearing and
settlement infrastructure and wider provision of services (including
risk-based services) by the infrastructure providers may unduly
distort competition (thereby risking the possibility of abuse
of a dominant position) and may raise issues of systemic risk.
However, other market participants
take the view that such concerns are outweighed by the large cost
savings to be derived from consolidation and that effective steps
can be taken to mitigate and control competition and risk concerns
that have been identified.
There are additional concerns that
the Commission should take into account the existing EU legal
framework and regulations, especially prudential regulation of
banks, in any future directive so as to avoid what could become
duplicate regulation which could affect the competitiveness of
EU players and markets compared to non-EU entities. The recent
approval of the ESCB-CESR Standards for Clearing and Settlement
adds complexity to the EU initiative and has raised questions
about the risk of increased cost caused by having to implement
multiple changes. However, CESR/ECB have indicated that these
standards will not yet enter into force: a consultation round
with industry is foreseen in 2005.
Most industry participants
are strongly advocating the view that a directive, if any should
be high level only and not prescriptive. These market participants
believe this is essential in order to ensure that a very fast
moving market environment is not prevented from making the rapid
developments necessary to compete in the broader international
markets by an inflexible fixed regulatory structure.
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